El presente ensayo toma como punto de partida varios artículos de opinión con el propósito de reflexionar sobre varias cuestiones que han surgido a raíz de la crisis sanitaria, económica y social del COVID-19. La pandemia ha puesto de relieve distintos asuntos trascendentales de nuestra sociedad: la desigualdad, el uso de la tecnología, la percepción de la realidad, el lenguaje, la solidaridad o los servicios públicos.

The relevance of smart speakers is steadily increasing, allowing users perform several daily tasks. From a commercial perspective, smart speakers also provide recommendations of products and services that may influence the consumer decision-making process. However, previous studies have mainly focused on the adoption of smart speakers, but there is a lack of proper guidelines that help design the way these devices should offer their consumption recommendations. Based on a stimulus-organism-response approach, we analyze how two features of smart speakers' recommendations influence (...) on the effectiveness of such recommendations through its impact on user engagement and attitude. Data was collected from a sample of undergrad students in Spain using an experiment design that focused on a restaurant recommendation, and analyzed using partial least squares. On the one hand, our results suggests that gender congruence generates user engagement with the smart speaker. On the other hand, message length is positively related to attitudes towards the restaurant, at a declining rate. In addition, while better attitudes lead to higher visiting intentions, the influence of engagement on visiting intentions is partially mediated via attitudes. Thus, our findings contribute to understand the antecedents of users' engagement with smart speakers, as well as its impact on the customers' willingness to follow smart speakers' recommendations, constituting a base to analyze the impact of artificial intelligence solutions aimed to smooth the transitions of a customer through the stages of purchase process. (shrink)

In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous (...) research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism. (shrink)

Child-to-parent violence is a growing public health problem with consequences for perpetrators and families. Most research has focused on individual and family risk factors. However, little is known about its links with individual outcomes. The aim of this study was to analyze the relationships between CPV and psychological distress, suicidal ideation, and self-concept in school-aged adolescents, taking into account the gender perspective. A study was conducted with a sample of 8,115 adolescents, aged between 11 and 16 years from the State (...) of Nuevo León, Mexico. A MANOVA 3 × 2 was performed to analyze the data. The results revealed that adolescents involved in CPV showed higher levels of psychological distress and suicidal ideation and lower levels of family and social self-concept. It was also observed that girls with higher levels of CPV scored the lowest levels of psychological distress and suicidal ideation, as well as the lowest levels of family self-concept. The findings highlight that adolescents and especially girls involved in CPV also report internal maladjustment outcomes. Finally, the results and their implications for research and intervention with adolescents involved in CPV are discussed. (shrink)

Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and sixteen languages. Overall, participants tended (...) to ascribe moral responsibility whether the perpetrator lacked sourcehood or alternate possibilities. However, for American, European, and Middle Eastern participants, being the ultimate source of one’s actions promoted perceptions of free will and control as well as ascriptions of blame and punishment. By contrast, being the source of one’s actions was not particularly salient to Asian participants. Finally, across cultures, participants exhibiting greater cognitive reflection were more likely to view free will as incompatible with causal determinism. We discuss these findings in light of documented cultural differences in the tendency toward dispositional versus situational attributions. (shrink)

Is behavioral integration a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data from over 5,000 people across 26 samples, spanning 22 countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we argue that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely asserts that p, nonlinguistic behavioral evidence is disregarded. In light of this, we (...) take ourselves to have discovered a universal principle governing the ascription of beliefs in folk psychology. (shrink)

Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi studies – as represented in our sample (...) – successfully replicated about 70% of the time. We discuss possible reasons for this relatively high replication rate in the field of experimental philosophy and offer suggestions for best research practices going forward. (shrink)

This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to (...) engage in “reflective” thinking. (shrink)

Does the Ship of Theseus present a genuine puzzle about persistence due to conflicting intuitions based on “continuity of form” and “continuity of matter” pulling in opposite directions? Philosophers are divided. Some claim that it presents a genuine puzzle but disagree over whether there is a solution. Others claim that there is no puzzle at all since the case has an obvious solution. To assess these proposals, we conducted a cross-cultural study involving nearly 3,000 people across twenty-two countries, speaking eighteen (...) different languages. Our results speak against the proposal that there is no puzzle at all and against the proposal that there is a puzzle but one that has no solution. Our results suggest that there are two criteria—“continuity of form” and “continuity of matter”— that constitute our concept of persistence and these two criteria receive different weightings in settling matters concerning persistence. (shrink)

Since at least Hume and Kant, philosophers working on the nature of aesthetic judgment have generally agreed that common sense does not treat aesthetic judgments in the same way as typical expressions of subjective preferences—rather, it endows them with intersubjective validity, the property of being right or wrong regardless of disagreement. Moreover, this apparent intersubjective validity has been taken to constitute one of the main explananda for philosophical accounts of aesthetic judgment. But is it really the case that most people (...) spontaneously treat aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity? In this paper, we report the results of a cross‐cultural study with over 2,000 respondents spanning 19 countries. Despite significant geographical variations, these results suggest that most people do not treat their own aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for theories of aesthetic judgment and the purpose of aesthetics in general. (shrink)

Appendix 1 was incomplete in the initial online publication. The original article has been corrected.

I show that speaker bias in _polarity focus questions_ (PFQs) is context sensitive, while speaker bias in _high negation questions_ (HNQs) is context insensitive. This leads me to develop separate accounts of speaker bias in each of these kinds of polar questions. I argue that PFQ bias derives from the fact that they are frequently used in conversational contexts in which an answer to the question has already been asserted by an interlocutor, thus expressing doubt about the prior assertion. This (...) derivation explains their context sensitivity, and the fact that similar bias arises from polar questions that lack polarity focus. I also provide novel evidence that the prejacents of HNQs lack negation, and thus only have an outer negation reading (see, e.g., Ladd in Papers from the seventeenth regional meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society, vol. 17, pp. 164–171, 1981 ; Romero and Han in Linguistics and Philosophy 27(5):609–658, 2004 ; Krifka in Contrastiveness in information structure, alternatives and scalar implicatures, pp. 359–398, 2017 ; AnderBois in Questions in discourse, pp. 118–171, 2019 ; Frana and Rawlins in Semantics and Pragmatics 12(16):1–48, 2019 ; Jeong in Journal of Semantics 38(1):49–94, 2020 ). Based on a treatment of HNQs as denoting unbalanced partitions (Romero and Han in Linguistics and Philosophy 27(5):609–658, 2004 ), and competition with their positive polar question alternatives, I propose a novel derivation of speaker bias in HNQs as a conversational implicature. Roughly, if the speaker is ignorant, then a positive polar question will be more useful because it is more informative, so the use of an HNQ conveys that the speaker is not ignorant. The denotation of the HNQ then makes clear which way the speaker is biased. The result separates high negation from verum focus, and I argue that it is more parsimonious and has better empirical coverage than prior accounts. (shrink)

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest wykładnia Jeana-Lu ca Mariona fenomenologii donacji jako swoistej filozoficznej teorii performansu. Inspiracje, kierunek oraz kontekst przedstawionej interpretacji wyznaczają istotne przeobrażenia współczesnej humanistyki, której krajobraz został ukształtowany przez liczne kontrtekstualne zwroty. Artykuł przedstawia główne motywy Marionowskiej fenomenologii donacji, takie jak kontrmetoda, dar, sakrament, objawienie, oddany, wydarzenie, przygodność, fenomen nasycony, świadek itp., doszukując się w nich performatywnych instrukcji. Artykuł kończy się wielowątkową krytyką Mariona fenomenologii donacji, pokazując dlaczego nie zdaje ona egzaminu i musi ustąpić fenomenologicznej zasadzie performancji.

Partindo do tratamento da questão sobre a função social do filósofo, constroem-se os aportes teóricos para direcionar alguns apontamentos para uma temática semelhante: a função social do professor de filosofia. Serão propostas quatro funções sociais para o filósofo como aportes para a discussão a respeito do papel social do professor de filosofia. É para chegar a esses aportes que a investigação é dividida em dois momentos. No primeiro a função social do filósofo é discutida com amparo das reflexões de Franklin (...) Leopoldo e Silva. Serão extraídas quatro funções sociais do filósofo. No segundo momento é discutida a relação entre filosofia e educação. As quatro funções sociais do filósofo serão aplicadas no contexto da atividade do professor de filosofia. O artigo se encerra com as Considerações Finais. (shrink)

This is a reply by the author to the contributors to a symposium on the book, The Range of Reasons (Oxford University Press, 2021).

Kunst schaffen -- Kunst rahmen -- Birgit Spalts reflektierende Urteilskraft -- Kunst einordnen -- Kunst: immanent.

This Element offers a systematic outline of ancient conceptions and uses of suspension of belief (understood broadly) while engaging with contemporary philosophy. It discusses the notion of epochē ('suspension of judgement') and other related terms, like aporia, aphasia, paradox, hypothesis, agnosticism, and Socratic wisdom. It examines the Academic and Pyrrhonian sceptics and some of their arguments and strategies for suspension. It also includes the use and conditions for suspension of belief in other philosophers like Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Plotinus, (...) Protagoras, and Democritus. The Element is divided into four thematic sections, each addressing one of the following questions: What is suspension of belief? When does it arise? What could its scope be? And what are its practical and moral implications? (shrink)

A psychedelic renaissance is currently taking place in mental healthcare. The number of psychedelic-assisted therapy trials is growing steadily, and some countries already grant psychiatrists special permission to use psychedelics in non-research contexts under certain conditions. These clinical advances must be accompanied by ethical inquiry. One pressing ethical question involves whether patients can even give informed consent to psychedelic-assisted therapy: the treatment’s transformative nature seems to block its assessment, suggesting that patients are unable to understand what undergoing psychedelic-assisted therapy actually (...) means for them and whether it aligns with their values. The present paper argues that patients often have sufficient knowledge to give informed consent because they know that they want to change their negative status quo and that psychedelic-assisted therapy offers an effective way to do so. Accordingly, patients can understand what the transformative nature of psychedelic-assisted therapy means for them and a make a value-aligned choice even if they are unable to anticipate the manifestation of a psychedelic experience. (shrink)

We point out some concepts that appear rather frequently in physics discussions, which, despite a seemingly innocent initial appearance, turn out to have important implicit implications that put into question the very assumption of their meaningfulness. The message of this essay is that, in order to avoid the ensuing confusions, their usage should be accompanied with clarifications that make them meaningful, and then to confront the often uncomfortable underlying assumptions required to do so. In particular, we will visit the notions (...) of novel physics occurring at a certain energy scale, or at certain distance from a black hole’s event horizon, and the various meanings of the word “fluctuations”. (shrink)

This study takes as its starting point CousinCousin, Victor’s HegelianHegelianism-sounding claim in his 1828 lectures that the history of philosophy is identical to philosophy itself—and it does so in order to interrogate the various resemblances and divergences between CousinCousin, Victor and Hegel when it comes to determining the relationship between philosophy and the history of philosophy. In particular, the study investigates the difference between the “official” position CousinCousin, Victor takes up in 1833 in which spiritualistSpiritualism philosophy grounds eclectic history of (...) philosophy and his earlier more experimental and provisional positions, which map roughly onto Hegel’s own various ways of articulating the philosophy-history of philosophy relationship. (shrink)

In this book Daniel Wegner offers a novel understanding of the relation of consciousness, the will, and our intentional and voluntary actions. Wegner claims that our experience and common sense view according to which we can influence our behavior roughly the way we experience that we do it is an illusion.

Příspěvek si klade dvojí cíl. V prvé řadě je jeho záměrem vyzdvihnout přínos monografie O revoluci pro celek myšlení Hannah Arendtové. Především pak nabízí interpretaci klíčového oddílu knihy, v němž spočívá vlastní jádro arendtovského návrhu „nové politické vědy“. Ústředním pro politický řád se ukazuje být rozdíl mezi pramenem moci a pramenem autority, která politickému řádu propůjčuje stabilitu. Příspěvek dokládá, že Arendtová v zakladatelském aktu politického společenství spatřuje dva „bludné kruhy“ – bludný kruh legitimity moci a bludný kruh legitimity zákonů. Zatímco (...) s prvním bludným kruhem si zdařilá americká revoluce věděla rady, druhý bludný kruh, který odkazuje k potřebě autority sankcionující pozitivní zákonodárství, ji uvedl do teoretických obtíží. Stať ukazuje, že Arendtová sama důsledně trvá na možnosti nalézt pramen autority výhradně v prostoru politického jednání. (shrink)

Classical theism is often said to suffer from the problem of modal collapse: if God is necessary and simple then all of his effects (creatures) are also necessary. Many classical theists have turned to extrinsic predication in response: God’s simple and necessary act is compatible with any number of possible effects or no effects, and is only said to be an act of creating in virtue of the existence of the universe itself. Leftow and Schmid criticize this solution for leading (...) to “providential collapse”: God would not have control over which creation obtains if all his intrinsic features are compatible with any possible universe. Thomistic classical theism avoids both modal collapse and providential collapse by utilizing the metaphysics of relations. With no differences within his simple essence/act, God can relate himself differently to his possible effects, willing some and not willing others. These relations determine whether or not the effects will exist. Thomistic classical theism’s version of divine simplicity is not incompatible with God having a multiplicity of relations, for the three divine persons are distinct relations within God. Divine simplicity is only incompatible with a multiplicity of absolute items within God. Furthermore, not all differences of relation are grounded in the different absolute characteristics of their relata. Rather, sometimes differences of relation themselves ground differences in the absolute characteristics of their relata. God’s divine act is thus said to be an act of willing this creation rather than that in virtue of his chosen, contingent relation to possible creatures, rather than in virtue of the creatures themselves. (shrink)

In this classic work by one of America's most distinguished historians, Daniel Boorstin enters into Thomas Jefferson's world of ideas.

The purpose of the article is to show how the questions of anomality and animality belong together in phenomenology. The figure of the human animal serves as the guideline of the study, namely the figure of a person who is not considered as similar to myself in the frame of a Husserlian characterization of normality. Husserl’s thinking is analyzed with respect to the problem of an intersubjective co-constitution of a common world. It is shown that Husserl only accepts animality and (...) anomality within the restrictive perspective of a so-called normal humanity, that of the adult man, healthy, reasonable and European. However, he constantly strives to include the anomality and animality into humanity as well, an intention that distinguishes him from Heidegger. Heidegger radicalized the question with respect to race, which serves him as a guideline for thinking the very own of the human being. Defending a thinking of exclusion, Heidegger refuses to animals as well as to anomals all right of citizenship in the community of human beings. The article ends by proposing to overcome this duality between an inclusive thinking and an exclusive thinking. (shrink)

Aquinas holds that by its nature the human will has happiness as its ultimate end in every choice, and yet he holds that one can and ought to love God more than oneself or one’s own happiness. This generates the so-called “problem of love”: how can an eudaimonist like Aquinas account for non-selfish love? I argue that Aquinas’s doctrine of goodness as the will’s object and his distinction between the love of desire and the love of friendship solve this problem (...) and indicate that Aquinas’s eudaimonism is only “subordinated eudaimonism.” By its nature the will has happiness—total inhering goodness—as its ultimate object secundum quid, and God—total subsisting goodness—as ultimate object simpliciter. Nevertheless, Aquinas argues on philosophical grounds and with the support of Aristotle’s Liber de Bona Fortuna that God Himself would have to move the will if one were to love God above oneself even in the order of nature. (shrink)

This chapter presents an account of the life and work of Francis Hutcheson. It charts his career from its beginnings in Dublin to the attempt to cement his place in British intellectual life that was his posthumously published A System of Moral Philosophy. Hutcheson’s ideas were not universally welcomed and acclaimed. Religious conservatives constantly challenged him even after he was elected to the Glasgow chair of moral philosophy. The chapter describes the rationalist critique of Hutcheson’s moral sense theory, the criticism (...) levelled at his conception of natural benevolence by those who remained attached to philosophical egoism, and the complaints of those who, under the influence often of Joseph Butler, believed that Hutcheson’s ethics needed to be supplemented by a more substantial account of moral obligation. (shrink)

One way of being responsible for an action is being praiseworthy for it. But what is the “praise” of which the praiseworthy agent is worthy? This paper provides a survey of answers to this question, i.e. a survey of possible accounts of praise’s nature. It then presents an overview of candidate norms governing our responses of praise. By attending to praise’s nature and appropriateness conditions, we stand to acquire a richer conception of what it is to be, and to regard (...) another as, a responsible agent. (shrink)

Knowing Better presents a novel solution to the problem of reconciling the seemingly conflicting perspectives of ordinary virtue and normative ethics. Normative ethics is a sophisticated, open-ended philosophical enterprise that attempts to articulate and defend highly general ethical principles. Such principles aspire to specify our reasons, and tell us what it is right to do. However, it is not plausible to suppose that virtuous people in general follow such philosophical principles. These principles are difficult to articulate and assess, and we (...) do not think that advanced philosophical expertise is a necessary requirement for virtue. At the same time, the virtuous do not only accidentally get things right; rather, they act well in a reliable fashion, and they do so by responding appropriately to genuine reasons. Daniel Star argues that the solution to this problem requires a new approach to understanding the relation between ethical theory and ordinary deliberation, a new way of thinking about the nature of practical authority and normative reasons, a new account of the nature of virtue, and a rethinking of how best to understand the role that knowledge plays in deliberation and action. (shrink)

This paper brings out an inconsistency between David Chalmers's dualism, which is the main element of his philosophy of mind, and his structuralism, which is the main element of his epistemology. The point is ad hominem , but the inconsistency if it can be established is of considerable independent interest. For the best response to the inconsistency, I argue, is to adopt what Chalmers calls ‘type‐C Materialism’, a version of materialism that has been much discussed in recent times because of (...) its promise to move us beyond the stand‐off between standard versions of materialism and dualism. In turn, if that version of materialism is true, both dualism and structuralism should be rejected. (shrink)